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What Cultural Studies needs is more theory 
 
The topic of the 2001 Cultural Studies Association of Australia conference was 'What's left of 
theory?' Not an easy question, of course, and one that I would like to approach by asking 
another: What do we mean by 'theory'.  
In May 2001, I published an article in the CSAA newsletter called 'What cultural studies needs is 
less Adorno'. Some of the responses I got to this piece suggested that my underlying message 
was 'what cultural studies needs is less theory'. I am taking the opportunity here to suggest that a 
rejection of Adorno is not the same thing as a rejection of theory. In fact, the title of this article 
can be expanded slightly: 'What cultural studies needs is more theory. And less Adorno'. 
The argument of my piece in the newsletter was that attempting to generalise cultural theories 
across different historical and cultural circumstances is not - it seems to me - always very useful. 
The distrust of mass culture evinced by writers of the Frankfurt School, for example, is perfectly 
comprehensible in the context in which they wrote: but I don't think it tells us very much about 
Australian - or British, or American - culture at the beginning of the twenty first century. We 
need to expand our theoretical bases, rather than contracting them. 
But by this, I do not mean simply including Žižek in our reading lists. Rather, I am interested in 
who we call a theorist, and what parts of culture we honour with the title of 'theory'. I am worried 
that we tend to think that academics and participants in what we used to call 'high culture' (before 
we dismantled such boundaries) are 'theorists'; while workers in popular forms of culture rarely 
receive that name. Working recently on the related concept of the 'public intellectual', I was 
depressed to see how many cultural studies writers see 'intellectuals' are being only academics, 
literary novelists and performance artists. By contrast, the category of cultural workers most 
commonly derided (by several writers) is the talk show host.  
Now, taking Stanley Fish's definition of the public intellectual as: 'someone who takes as his or 
her subject matters of public concern, and has the public’s attention’, talk show hosts are 
undoubtedly public intellectuals (quoted in Dessaix, 1998: 10). But writer after writer accuses 
these writers of the 'degradation' of civic life (Giroux, 2000: 136), 'personal[ising] and … 
trivial[ising]' serious debate' (Becker, 1997: 13), who partake in 'empty talk' (Goldfard, 1998: 
210) 'talking heads [without] … thinking minds …' Wark, 1999: 35). No logically satisfactory 
distinction can be drawn between a talk show host and a performance artist: but we often talk as 
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though the distinction is obvious. Of course it is, but not in the way we would like to think: it is, 
once again, the distinction between high and low culture.  
If, as cultural studies researchers, we refuse such a distinction, can we then turn to popular 
culture to find our theorists for understanding Australia in the twenty first century? To do so, we 
have to address a number of our prejudices about what counts as theory, and what counts, more 
broadly, as intelligence. Thomas McLaughlin, discussing the concept of vernacular theory, 
makes an important point: 
theory is not the elite activity that both its enemies and defenders claim it to be. It is an integral and 
crucial element in everyday culture … I have always been sceptical of the academy's easy 
conflation of genteel cultural style and intellectual skills … (McLaughlin, 1996: 29) 
Let us accept, for the purposes of this paper, Henry Jenkins' definition of theory as: 'speculation 
… a set of propositions larger than the individual example' (Jenkins, 2001). Of course, such a 
gambit has implications. There are important histories to be written about the concept of 'theory' 
in cultural studies itself - what the term came to mean, and why; and how the use of the term has 
been an important part of our understanding of what we do - as David Simpson does in his 
Romanticism, Nationalism and the Revolt Against Theory (1993). For example, Mark Gibson has 
called my attention to the importance of: 
the prestige of Frenchness, dress styles of intellectual coteries, institutional sites such as Murdoch 
and Griffith … 'theory' [as] a badge of identification … [and] the revolt against empiricism -  
simplified and caricatured as positivism ('just give us the facts') … (Gibson, 2001) 
But this article is not about these histories. It is about expanding the places where we might find 
our theories. High culture often provides the tools to study popular culture. But why should not 
popular culture provide the tools for studying high culture? Why can we not use theories of 
culture derived from Buffy the Vampire Slayer to read Deleuze and Guattari (should we want 
to?); Big Brother to interpret Foucault? Why do we so rarely use the theorising of Hitchcock to 
critique Lacan? 
As Legally Blonde has recently shown us, it is possible to imagine intelligence which is 
feminine, young, concerned with style, with looks, with clothes and with hair, with fluffy things, 
and nice things, and little dogs that fit in handbags - without being any less 'serious' or less 
intelligent. Can we make the same leap in cultural studies? Writing about talk shows has 
demonstrated that this form is often denigrated by critics and academics precisely because it 
employs forms of discourse which are traditionally feminine (see, especially, Shattuc, 1997, 
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chapter 4). Can we allow such prejudices to inform our work, when a central tenet of cultural 
studies is that cultural preferences are not innocent and are not objective? 
We already know, without stepping outside of our safely academic canon of theorists, that we 
cannot measure the worth of theory by its adherence to any one set of criteria. It need not be 
rational, nor logical, nor draw on evidence external to itself. It can present its argument by means 
of narrative, of image, of poetry and suggestion, and still be respected as theory - thank you 
Deleuze and Guattari. When theorists in popular culture present their ideas in such a way, why 
cannot we take them seriously? 
Why might we want to do this? Why might we turn - to pick merely one example - to Australian 
lifestyle TV innovator Don Burke for theories of national identity and community formation (see 
McKee, 2001)? In part, my argument is simply that the logic that animates cultural studies - the 
desire not to denigrate popular culture simply for being popular - demands such a form of 
engagement. But more than this, I think that to take such an approach might help us to deal with 
the repeated charges of living in the 'ivory tower' that are laid against academics in Britain, 
America and Australia when they dare to comment on social issues. A chasm is insistently put in 
place between the academy and other parts of culture, by those who live outside the walls of the 
academy. What worries me is that this chasm might be neither illogical or indefensible. It 
actually makes perfect sense, given the ways in which much academic work - and, I am sad to 
say, much cultural studies - insistently values high culture over low (even while claiming to do 
otherwise). So, for example, reading the following comments saddens me. In an article by the 
Chairs of Reconciliation Australia (that is, reconciliation between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians), they discuss the way forward for reconciliation, and state that: 
It is time to stop bickering and start doing. Policy is best developed when it is the outcome of 
practice, not ideology and rhetoric. We should be concerned with people, not theory (2001: 13) 
We should be concerned with people, not theory 
I don't agree with this position in any straightforward way. But it does push me towards another 
question. What are the implications of academics worrying about 'what's left of theory', when in 
wider culture, theory itself is being rejected as something that is not just irrelevant, but 
pernicious. There is obviously a theoretical position being called upon by these writers - a 
metatheory - which posits an idea of 'theory' as something that is markedly distinct from the 
ongoing processes of everyday culture. What worries me is that I think that the Chairs of 
Reconciliation Australia may be correct. As academics, our theories are insistently taken only 
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from those parts of culture which are marked off from the ordinary. In such a situation, it is not 
remarkable that vernacular theorists - of whom these metatheorists from Reconciliation Australia 
are obviously examples - are concerned that 'theory' (as academics name it) is insistently kept 
separate from everyday life and ordinary culture.  
We can see in other areas of Australian culture some very interesting examples of metatheorising 
going on, theorising what it might mean to do theorising. One of my favourite theorists at the 
moment is Tony McNamara, who explored the nature of everyday theorising in a recent episode 
of the Channel Ten series The Secret Life of Us (8 October 2001).  
Throughout this episode Kel (Deborah Mailman) and Alex (Claudia Karvan) attempt to hammer 
out a workable theory of relationships. This occurs in the context of a program which is 
specifically about theories of relationships, which tests out, through thought experiments 
(narratives) a massive number of possible variation of platonic and sexual relationships, to see 
how well they might work under various circumstances.  
Kel is dating a man who is perfect. She is deeply unhappy about this. Through a series of 
discussions, she tries to work out how this new evidence fits into theories she has been 
developing about what makes a good relationship. Throughout the episode, she and Alex sit and 
discuss this issue, which is explicitly named as a problem of theory: Kel claims that she is a 
'noted theorist on this subject'. But this is not the theory that we recognise from our cultural 
studies' subjects. '[I]t's something you prefer to talk to girls about', says Kel. This is feminised 
discussion. It is gossip - and it is theory. Kel grabs Alex as she walks past, and pulls her down to 
the sofa for some quick, clandestine, theorising:  
Guess what? I've worked out my doubts. I know why I have them. All the guys I've gone out with 
before have been Mr Wrongs. I've worked hard at those relationships. I overcompensate for their 
failings. So it makes sense that I feel different with Paulo. Mr Right should be completely different 
from Mr Wrong. It takes so long to find Mr Right, and there are so many Mr Wrongs, that by the 
time Mr Right comes along, it feels wrong because it's right. 
Theorising and gossip. The pleasure of trying to make sense of things. Exchanging information - 
evidence - and trying to fit it into a wider schema. A desire to find the truth necessarily there, but 
an awareness that, in this feminised form of communication, certainty will never be, can never 
be, arrived at. And more than this - a knowledge that, although the search for an imagined truth 
is a necessary prerequisite for theory - for gossip - it is not, ultimately its function. It is the gossip 
itself, the theory itself, which produces the end product - community; communication; a practice 
that works on a relationship. One can neither gossip, nor theorise, by oneself. This is theorising 
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that is everyday; familiar; feminine. Theorising which is outside of the fatal, the meaningful, the 
masculine, the academy, high culture. And yet is still - explicitly - theorising.  
How does this gossipy theorising work? It is interested in irritants - ideas or experiences that 
simply don't fit the theory. It is this, rather than endless restatement, that keeps everyday 
theorising at work. So Kel, for example, works through the abstractions she can generalise from 
her previous thinking on relationships: 'If I had a Mr Right checklist, Paulo would have ticks in 
the following boxes - considerate, sensitive, thoughtful, responsible and practical. He was a 
definite Mr Right. So what was the problem?'. She is trying to deal with the irritant - the 
empirical - that does not work for her theories. This I find attractive as a model of theorising - for 
as academics we so rarely allow this to happen, finding that our theories need very little 
reworking - if we stay at a suitably abstract level from which we can claim that everything that 
appears to look different in culture, which may demand explanation, is, in fact, the same. 
This everyday theorising is remarkably self-aware. As Kel works through her latest theory about 
the relationship, Claudia Karvan gives her a concerned look. 'Often theories are little more than 
rationalisations', she says. A good point, and one which is illustrated here. For Kel, it is, 
ultimately, about 'how she feels' - but she can manage to produce a theory to make this the 
logical thing to do and feel. We do not always make clear that we understand we are doing the 
same thing in our academic theorising. 
And this everyday theorising doesn't make claims beyond the local. Alex finally comes up with 
another theory to explain the facts of Kel's feelings. 
Kel says, 'I think I like it rough. Paulo says to him is finding someone that's going to make it all 
smooth sailing'. Alex claims that: 
Paulo's dreaming. How can two adults, with differing needs and wants, held together only by 
their undying passion for each other, have a smooth sailing relationship with each other? 
That's the grit in the oyster 
She goes on to propose her theory of relationships: 
The grit is the battle between two individuals to give and get what they need from each other, while 
forming a loving couple, yet still retaining their self respect, their individuality, and all the things 
that attracted them to the other person in the first place. This tension is part of what it's grow into a 
pearl 
Kel: 'As a well-known theorist on this subject, I take my hat off to you, because that was a 
ripper'. 
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But the theory only works for Kel, and has only emerged in relationship to Paulo. It cannot be 
extrapolated to all relationships - 'you need drama, Kel. Paulo doesn't provide it'. And we know 
that it will change: that as she meets the next man, Kel will begin to theorise again; and she will 
drag Alex back onto the sofa to begin, again, this rationalisation, this attempt to produce 
explanations and frameworks for making sense of experience that we call gossip, and theory.  
This is only a glimpse into the world of theorising that goes on in popular culture; and a neat one 
for this argument, because it attempts to theorise about theorising. The point of the argument is 
to suggest that if we want to ask 'what's left of theory?', then we have to ask popular culture, as 
much as we do the canonical writings published by academic presses. All I have done with The 
Secret Life of Us is perform a little light exegesis on its performed theories of empiricism, 
generalisability, the degree to which it is useful to insist upon the irreducibility of the event, and 
the relationship of gender to these concerns. Beyond its use for this particular argument, there are 
of course other things I could do with McNamara's work. I could draw it into dialogue with 
academically-trained philosophers musing on similar topics (Hume, perhaps - or Nancy Fraser: 
maybe even Deleuze). Or I could map its place in one of the many alternative traditions of 
popular theorising which are so often forgotten by historians of theory (see Rose, 2001 for an 
account of some elements of the tradition of British working class theorising)1.  
What cultural studies needs is more theory. Hopefully, as cultural studies practitioners, our 
understanding of theory will not be stuck in 'what academics do', or 'what intellectuals do'. The 
logic of the cultural studies project demands that we recognise that theorising is something that 
happens as much in popular culture as in academic writing; and that we cannot dismiss the 
thinking of those people who do not happen to be artists or academics simply for that fact. 
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1 For an example of an attempt to map an area of popular theorising in more detail, and to 
develop a research project based on it, see Australian Television: A Genealogy of Great Moments 
(McKee, 2001). For examples of work which attempts to bring popular and canonical theorising 
into productive dialogue, see the works of William Irwin and Richard Hanley; Hanley, 1997; 
Irwin, ed, 2000; Irwin, Conard and Skoble eds, 2001. 
